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Late Twentieth Century efforts to promote democracy in Africa were rewarded in one part of 
the continent at least. Flying in the face of the voice of Afro-pessimism, the first non-racial 
elections in South Africa in April 1994 heralded the end of apartheid and gave birth to a 
liberal democracy. They have been succeeded by two further democratic elections that have 
been inclusive, relatively free, fair and peaceful. However, this historic period of change in 
South Africa has been accompanied by a continental revival or reinforcement of ‘traditional 
rule’,3 and an increase in the salience of customary practices,4 in a trend that has been referred 
to as “re-traditionalisation”. 5 In this context and despite its democratic transition, South Africa 
has become caught up in a wider drift towards resurgent tradition. This is perhaps not 
surprising given that South Africa is as rich in institutions with indigenous roots and founded 
on customary practice as many other African countries. Nor is it without precedent if viewed 
both in historical and contemporary comparative perspective that traditional authorities in 
South Africa are competing for authority with the country’s new liberal democratic 
institutions.6 What was not foreseen, however, was that South Africa’s new democracy led by 
an African National Congress (ANC) government would adopt such a conciliatory approach 
towards chieftaincy in South Africa, even at the expense of hard won liberal democratic 
principles.  
 
Adherents of tradition argue that customary institutions in Africa and the traditional leaders 
that uphold them have a stabilizing influence, particularly given the inadequacies of many 
post-colonial African states. It is suggested that this remains the case for South Africa as well 
and that chieftaincy, though tainted by its association with segregation and apartheid, has 
nevertheless provided continuity of governance, particularly in rural areas where there were 
scant alternative structures. Opponents see the return to tradition as a regressive step that 
                                                 
1 This paper is the first of a series of papers coming out of that component of the Crisis States Research Centre 
concerned with institutional multiplicity and, more specifically, the role of traditional authorities in both conflict 
and reconstruction in states having undergone periods of political contestation and violence. It provides a 
conceptual and historical background to the field research in KwaZulu-Natal, which includes interviews with 
traditional authorities, councillors, politicians and local government officials, as well as a survey of residents in 
three peri-urban traditional authority areas. 
2 Jo Beall is  in the Development Studies Institute (DESTIN) and part of the LSE team of the Crisis States 
Research Centre. Sibongiseni Mkhize is Director of the Msunduzi Museum in KwaZulu-Natal. Shahid Vawda is 
a Lecturer in the School of Governance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.  
3 S. Berry, Chiefs Know their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power and the Past in Asante 1896-1996, 
Portsmouth NH: Heinemann, 2001; M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
Late Colonialism, London: James Currey, 1996. 
4 H. Moore & Sanders, T. (eds), Magical Interpretations, Material Realities, London: Routledge, 2001. 
5 P. Chabal & J. P. Daloz, Africa Works, Disorder as Political Instrument, Oxford: James Currey, 1999. 
6 E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; 
L. Vail (ed.), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 
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undermines progress towards democratic consolidation in Africa generally and in South 
Africa more particularly. In many respects these concerns are not new and reflect careful 
historical debate in South Africa that remains relevant in informing and understanding the 
contemporary period.7 With this in mind this paper explores the institution of ubukhosi, or 
chieftainship, in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), where resurgent tradition is particularly vociferous, 
but also part of a longer history exhibiting both continuities and discontinuities.8 Against this 
background it considers whether the recognition of traditional authorities and the powers and 
functions accorded to them in South Africa, and more particularly KZN, constitutes a 
potential faultline of crisis in South Africa’s fragile emergent democracy or a site of stability 
in a politically volatile province. The question is framed by recourse to institutional theory 
and is answered by setting the contemporary experience of ‘negotiating tradition’ in 
KwaZulu-Natal against a background of apartheid government, resistance and political 
violence in the province.    
 
Background on KwaZulu-Natal 
Forged out of the former Province of Natal and the so-called ‘independent homeland’ of 
KwaZulu, the Province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) has had a difficult history and was born of 
political conflict during the twilight years of apartheid that assumed the proportions of a civil 
war. The price paid in the province for an end to apartheid and the transition to democracy 
was the loss of 20,000 lives since 1984.9 At its height, the violence led to the displacement of 
half a million people with more people dying in KZN in a decade than in 20 years of fighting 
in Northern Ireland.10 Nevertheless, today KwaZulu-Natal appears to have transformed itself 
from the epicentre of violent conflict and civic breakdown in South Africa to one where 
accord and coexistence prevail. This apparent transformation has been assisted by what 
Taylor calls “a politics of denial” about “a war that no one wants to admit or recognize”. 11 It 
has also been facilitated by a number of political compromises by national government that 
hold particular resonance at provincial and local levels in KZN. The first compromise was 
that the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), accorded a cabinet post in the 
first government of national unity to Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, the former Chief 
Minister of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and leader of the rival Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP). This position was maintained following the 1999 election when Buthelezi became 
                                                 
7 W. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; W. Beinart & C. Bundy, 
Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987. 
8 N. Cope, To Bind the Nation: Solomon kaDinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism 1913-1933, Pietermaritzburg: 
University of Natal Press, 1993. Also S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-1908 Disturbances in Natal, 
London: Clarendon Press, 1970; The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 
1986; and ‘Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness’ in L. Vail 
(ed.) The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, pp.215-240). 
9 R. Taylor, ‘Justice Denied: Political Violence in KwaZulu -Natal After 1994’, African Affairs, 101 (2002), 
p.473. 
10 Jeffrey says, based on a conservative estimate, calculated from the number of houses known to have been 
destroyed between 1987 and 1989, that at least 10,500 people must have been displaced from their homes during 
this period alone (A. Jeffrey, The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict, Johannesburg: South African Institute 
of Race Relations, 1997). A more recent estimate is that between 200,000 and 500,000 refugees fled political 
conflict in KZN in the period from 1984 to 1994 (E. Mariño, The 1994 Emergency in KwaZulu-Natal, South 
Africa: Statements and Observations from the International Observer to the Emergency, Durban-Johannesburg, 
April-July 1994, p.14). 
11 Taylor (2002), p.504. 
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Minister of Home Affairs.12 The second compromise was the decision to accommodate South 
Africa’s traditional leaders in the governance of the country. 13  
 
The politics of compromise were entered into not least with the volatile politics of KwaZulu-
Natal in mind. During the negotiation phase, Buthelezi supported the demands of the former 
ruling Nationalist Party for a federalist system of government and although they lost on this 
score, he tried to ensure greater power for the province of KZN through preserving the powers 
of traditional authorities, a critical element of his IFP support base. In the first non-racial 
democratic elections in a government of national unity in 1994 the IFP won a narrow majority 
in the new provincial legislature and KZN became one of only two provinces to fall outside 
the control of the ANC.14 In the 1999 elections, neither party won a clear majority and a 
coalition provincial government was formed on the back of a shaky truce. Floor crossing in 
the Provincial Legislature subsequently rocked political calm.15 This allowed the ANC and its 
allies in the province to secure a two-seat majority so that for the first time the political 
dominance of the IFP in KZN was dislodged, unleashing a backlash from the Party involving 
accusations of bribery and corruption against those who defected to the ANC.16 In the 2004 
elections the ANC won a narrow majority (46.98%) over the IFP (36.82%) but neither party 
appears able to make up an alliance bloc.17 At the time of writing, despite the elections having 
been declared free and fair, the IFP was challenging the results and it looks as if once again, 
the prospect of an inclusive and cooperative coalition government in the province will be 
elusive.  
 
Critical to the delicate power balance between the ANC and the IFP in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Provincial Legislature has been the fact that each party receives its votes from predominantly 
urban and rural constituencies respectively. The IFP has its major power base in the rural 
areas and commands strong support from the amakhosi (chiefs) and their izinduna (headmen). 
It has nurtured an urban following through alliances with white middle-class elites in the 
cities, notably through political accommodation with the Democratic Alliance (DA) party in 
the context of local government politics, as well as through courting Zulu migrant workers 
living in urban hostels, mobilised through local IFP branches. The ANC has been stronger in 
the province’s urban areas and has only gradually made inroads into rural political 
                                                 
12 Buthelezi was at first given the role of Deputy President, later ceded to Jacob Zuma, one of the few high-
ranking Zulu members of the ANC. At the time of writing it was not clear where Buthelezi would be 
accommodated following the 2004 election. 
13 It is recognized that the terminology around traditional leaders is contentious and that the use of terms such as 
traditional authorities and chiefs have been questioned and debated in South Africa. In KZN the vernacular Zulu 
terms inkosi (chief) and amakhosi (chiefs) are used. The Zulu term for the institution of chieftainship is 
ubukhosi. However, when the discussion is not focused exclusively on KwaZulu-Natal the terms traditional 
leaders and chiefs are used interchangeably here, stripped of pejorative connotations. 
14 The other was Western Cape Province. In 1994 nine provinces were created out of the four provinces of so-
called ‘white South Africa’ and the ten former ethnically defined ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’ created under the 
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959.   
15 This was provoked by changes in national legislation allowing incumbent elected politicians to switch party 
allegiances mid-term. The legislation was designed by the ANC led national government to address in its favour, 
problems being encountered at local government level in the Western Cape but the situation in KZN could not be 
excluded from this legislation although the implications are more ambiguous.  
16 At the time it led to the firing of three ANC Members from the Executive Committee (MECs) by the IFP 
Provincial Premier, Lionel Mtshali (Sunday Times, 13 April 2003). While on the surface such goings on might 
seem nothing more than political shenanigans, they were invariably watched with some anxiety in KZN, where 
fears of renewed political violence lay just below the surface. Such latent fear helps explain why politically 
neutral commentators prefer a coalition government to narrow majorities (Mail and Guardian, 11-16 April, 
2003).   
17 http://iafrica.com/news/saelectionfocus/news/316632.htm, last accessed 18 April 2004. 
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constituencies, its progress having been consistently blocked by the amakhosi. It is for this 
reason, therefore, that ubukhosi, the institution of chieftainship in KZN, has become a 
political faultline along which democratic governance and indeed the peaceful transition is 
constantly tested.  
 
 
Institutions and Social Change 
At a function in Greytown in April 2003, attended by the IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi 
who was receiving the freedom of the town, Prince Gideon Zulu, the IFP MEC for Social 
Development lashed out at IFP defectors to the ANC in the recent floor-crossing episode, by 
saying they were behaving “as if they were bigger than their mothers’ bums”. 18 His remarks 
were broadcast on a local radio station, Ukhozi FM. They subsequently entered Hansard 
when he was asked by Peggy Nkonyeni, an ANC MEC in the Provincial Legislature, to 
retract his remarks. He refused, saying “I am not going to take nonsense from you, woman, 
your mother’s bum”. Eventually, however, and at the insistence of the Speaker of the House 
Bonga Mdletshe, he offered a grudging apology. Peggy Nkonyeni said “As a woman, I feel 
belittled and humiliated and believe that [Prince Gideon] Zulu is a sexist who, like the racists 
of yesteryear, has no public role in our non-racial and non-sexist society”. Prince Gideon Zulu 
countered that his remarks were not insulting because buttocks were a subject of praise in 
Zulu culture, where men often “politely asked women to show off their bums”. This retort 
notwithstanding, Nkonyeni has lodged a complaint with the Human Rights Commission and 
the Commission on Gender Equality, both set up after the 1994 elections to give force to 
constitutional commitments on human rights and non-sexism respectively.  
 
This incident is recounted because it encapsulates something of the competing institutions and 
associated norms and values that characterize political life and governance in contemporary 
KZN. One reading of the exchange would simply be to see Prince Gideon Zulu championing 
the cause of ‘traditional Zulu culture’, and Peggy Nkonyeni as sounding the voice of 
modernist reason. Another approach, and the one adopted here, is to be wary of such 
bifurcated analysis in favour of one that seeks to understand how processes of institutional 
transformation occur within a context of institutional multiplicity. Institutions are understood 
here as the humanly devised rules that constrain or enable individual and collective behaviour. 
They comprise formal rules, informal constraints and the enforcement characteristics of 
both.19 Institutions are considered as efficient because they enhance information flows and 
reduce uncertainty and as durable because of their inherent inertia, given the high transaction 
costs of change.20 They affect all aspects of social existence from political decision-making to 
the rules governing personal relationships and form the framework in which these social 
interactions take place.21 Like culture, institutions are not static but they are inherently inert. 
Configured by past processes and circumstances they are never in full accord with the 
requirements of the present.22 Following Cleaver, we refer to institutions not as formal and 
informal but as ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘socially embedded’.23 We would argue that bureaucratic 
                                                 
18 Sunday Times, 13 April 2003. 
19 D. C. North, ‘The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development’, in J. Harriss, J. Hunter and 
C.M. Lewis (eds), The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, London: Routledge, 1995, 
p.23. 
20 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990. 
21 J. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.1. 
22 T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, An Economic Study of Institutions, New York: Macmillan, 1902. 
23 F. Cleaver, ‘Moral Ecological Rationality, Institutions and the Management of Common Property Resources’, 
Development and Change, 31 (2000), pp.361-383. 
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and socially embedded organisations can be more or less formal. Hence, traditional authority 
in South Africa is both socially embedded and imbued with hierarchical and patriarchal 
values and norms. However, it is also bureaucratic, as traditional institutions have become 
formalised as part of government, governance and development.  
 
Douglas sees institutions becoming socially embedded by way of iterative cognitive 
processes,24 and Giddens describes the rooting of institutions in terms of social systems 
understood as the “reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, organized as regular 
social practices”. 25 What this suggests with regard to the acrimonious exchange between 
Prince Gideon Zulu and Peggy Nkonyeni in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is that 
eventually one frame of meaning and the social institutions that support it might give way to 
the other, or alternatively they may adapt and mutate through the encounter. Bates has 
suggested that political interventions and settlements can play an important role in the 
creation of new or the evolution of old institutions.26 This paper considers institutional change 
in relation to ubukhosi and how this has been engaged with as a political process within the 
context of KZN past and present. Both the tenacity and mutation of the institution of ubukhosi 
are demonstrated, from colonialism through to apartheid and well into the post-apartheid era 
in South Africa, so that today in a context of institutional multiplicity, democratically-elected 
members of the national and provincial parliaments, as well as ward councillors, operate 
alongside chiefs and headmen, who owe their position to lineage, inheritance and patronage.  
 
Chieftaincy as an Evolving Institution 
One of the key problems facing South Africa is that chieftaincy in Africa operates on 
principles that are antithetical to democratic ideals. Selection for the office of chief is not by 
popular vote, but is usually hereditary and for life. It is a hierarchical and patriarchal system 
that has largely excluded women from office,27 and it supports customary laws that are 
exclusionary and oppressive towards women, particularly in relation to property rights. In 
such a system, there are obvious limits to representation and downward accountability. In 
Africa more generally, traditional authorities have become dependent on elected or military 
governments for resources or recognition, leading to awkward lines of upward accountability. 
In South Africa similar axes operated in relation to the apartheid regime. Nevertheless, 
political pragmatism has demanded that a variety of governments have sought co-existence 
with chieftaincy in Africa, so that over the years the institution of chieftainship has endured. 
In many countries the power and influence of traditional authorities is such that politicians 
seeking elected office compete with them at their peril. However, to say traditional authorities 
are hardy perennials is only half the picture. Though resilient, the institution of chieftaincy 
across the continent bears the battle scars of having to adapt to survive. This is as true for 
South Africa as elsewhere. 
 
During the colonial period the British experimented with two contrasting systems for ruling 
the indigenous African population.  The first was to try and weaken the institution of 
chieftainship and govern through the colonial bureaucracy. In South Africa this system was 
attempted, for example, in the Eastern Cape. The second system was to rely on local 
indigenous rulers to administer and control the local population in a system of ‘indirect rule’. 
                                                 
24 M. Douglas, How Institutions Think , London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986. 
25 A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984, p.25. 
26 R. H. Bates, ‘Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An Assessment of the New Institutionalism’, in J. 
Harriss, J. Hunter and C.M. Lewis (eds), The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, 
London: Routledge, 1995, pp.27-48. 
27 There are a few women chiefs or regents in KZN. 
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Devised by Lord Lugard in Northern Nigeria and others such as Sir Donald Cameron in 
British East Africa, this was the system adopted in Colonial Natal by the Secretary for Native 
Affairs, Sir Theophilus Shepstone (1845-76). Known among the Zulu people as ‘Somtseu’, 
Shepstone’s approach to native administration at the time became known as the ‘Shepstone 
System’, which saw both appointed and hereditary chiefs become agents of the colonial 
government and totally dependent on it for resources. Thus engagement with colonialism 
changed the nature of ubukhosi in the territory of present day KZN.  
 
It has been argued that in pre-colonial South Africa chiefdoms were ‘first among equals’. 
Communities were fluid and the inkosi had ill-defined authority over the imizi (homesteads) 
in his jurisdiction. Bound together by ties of kinship, marriage or clientalism, they derived 
their authority from the allegiance of subjects and functioned through the distribution and 
redistribution of accumulated tribute, usually in the form of cattle.28 In other words, the 
authority of the amakhosi was derived not from coercive power but from patronage, ritual and 
symbolic power, itself the outcome of negotiated processes at the local level, as Butler 
explains:  
Certainly the chief would have been looked to as the guarantor of tribal harmony 
(by playing a key role in conflict resolution); of economic viability of homesteads 
(by playing a key role in managing the allocation of land rights and land-use 
rights to households); and social and cultural coherence and continuity (by 
playing a key role in social and ritual aspects of tribal life).29 
To a considerable degree, these remain the core responsibilities of the amkhosi in KZN to the 
present day. However, this is by way of a sometime turbulent history that changed the texture, 
if not the basic functions, of ubukhosi and even in the pre-colonial era chieftaincy or 
traditional authority was not unchanging.30 
 
During the early colonial period in Natal, Shepstone augmented the position of the amakhosi 
by recognizing their right to allocate land, which was held under communal tenure, a factor 
that did much to reinforce their authority. However, Sheptstone retained the right to depose as 
well as appoint chiefs and he dealt severely with recalcitrant amakhosi. Moreover, from 1850 
magistrates were appointed to administer Native Law and to try criminal cases, leaving 
traditional leaders in charge only of minor criminal cases and dispute resolution. In later years 
the ‘Shepstone System’ was refined and codified, ossifying the fluidity and malleability of 
custom, 31 in what Mamdani has described as a “regime of total control”.32 Indirect rule was 
entrenched under Union, with the Black Administration Act (No. 38 of 1927) stripping 
traditional leaders of more of their autonomy and allowing the Governor-General of South 
                                                 
28 J. Laband, Rape of Sand: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century, Johannesburg: 
Jonathan Ball, 1995. 
29 Butler, M., ‘Traditional Authorities: Know Where to Land. Traditional Authority and Land in KwaZulu-
Natal’, report for Association for Rural Advancement, Pietermaritzburg: AFRA, 2002, p.6. 
30 Between the late 18th Century and the mid-19th Century a period of political centralization and state formation 
under the ascendancy of Shaka Zulu saw the rise of the Zulu kingdom. In stronger chieftaincies both hierarchies 
and the power of the inkosi increased, while conflict led to the flight or subjugation of weaker chiefdoms. This 
process is known as the mfecane (the crushing) and is a subject of much scholarly attention (J. Guy, The 
Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982; C. Hamilton, Terrific Majesty: The Powers 
of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention, Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1998; J. Wright & C.  
Hamilton, ‘Ethnicity and Political Change Before 1840’, in R. Morrell (ed.), Political Economy and Identities in 
KwaZulu-Natal, Historical and Social Perspectives, Durban: Indicator Press, 1996. 
31 J. Beall, Class, Race and Gender: The Political Economy of Women in Colonial Natal, MA Thesis, University 
of Natal, Durban, 1983. 
32 Mamdani (1996), p.63. 
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Africa to prescribe the duties, powers and conditions of service of the chiefs, who he could in 
turn, appoint or dispose. The Nationalist Government that came to power in 1948 initially 
adopted a conciliatory stance towards traditional leaders as they fitted into their vision of 
‘separate development’. However, as Govan Mbeki concluded, they served apartheid as “baas 
boys” and tried and convicted in “bush courts” those who fell foul of the regime’s 
regulations.33  
 
In much of the country traditional authorities were estranged from their people as they 
became increasingly indebted to the South African government, leading to their declining 
legitimacy and popularity. 34 However, the position of Inkosi Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, 
himself a traditional leader,35 as well as being premier of the self-governing territory of 
KwaZulu, was more ambiguous.36 Buthelezi cleverly employed a strategy of what Maré and 
Hamilton called “loyal resistance”.37 This involved pragmatic accommodation with apartheid 
state institutions, from within the KwaZulu bantustan, which Buthelezi dubbed a “liberated 
zone”.38 Combining the resources of office, his IFP power base and  an appropriation of many 
of the symbols of Zulu culture,39 Buthelezi challenged the supremacy of the ANC in 
resistance politics at the national level and mounted a serious struggle for control of Natal and 
KwaZulu at the regional level. He was able to do this because of his support base among 
KZN’s amakhosi and their izinduna, or headmen, who both bought into and gave credence to 
his use of Zulu ethnic identity for political purposes.40  
 
Nevertheless, in order to understand the struggle over ubukhosi within the broader polity of 
the province, it is important to recognise that historically, as in the present, Buthelezi has not 
always had exclusive purchase on the institution. In the early years of the century, traditional 
authorities were closely associated with the liberation struggle in KwaZulu-Natal, from 
whence heralded one of the ANC’s early leaders, Chief Albert Luthuli. In his address on the 
occasion of being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961 he emphasised the role of 
traditional leaders in resistance. He said that: “Our history is one of opposition to domination, 
of protest and refusal to submit to tyranny.... Great chieftains resisted manfully white 
intrusion”. 41 The early ANC enjoyed considerable support from the chiefs, not least because 
of the way they were affected by the Natives and Land Act of 1913.42 However, when the 
early ANC failed to win back the land their involvement with the Congress waned. Indeed, 
once chieftaincy became subsumed within apartheid homeland structures, the ANC explicitly 
                                                 
33 G. Mbeki, South Africa: The Peasants’ Revolt, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 
34 Beinart & Bundy (1987). 
35 Buthelezi is an inkosi and claims royal lineage as King Cetshwayo kaMpande was his maternal great 
grandfather. On his father’s side, he also asserts that his paternal great grandfather served the same king as prime 
minister and was a commander-in-chief of the Zulu army (G. Maré & G. Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: 
Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of ‘Loyal Resistance’, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987, p.15). 
36 Marks (1986). 
37Maré & Hamilton (1987). 
38 Maré & Hamilton (1987), p.195. 
39 The appropriation of symbols extended to national resistance culture so that the yellow, green and black 
colours of the ANC were also the colours of Inkatha, while the Zulu shield was the symbol of Umkonto weSizwe, 
the armed wing of the ANC, as well as Inkatha. 
40 G. Maré, Brothers Born of Warrior Blood, Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 
1992. 
41 Document 65: “Nobel Peace Prize Address” by Chief A.J. Luthuli, 11 December 1961. Published in T. Karis 
& G. M. Gerhart (1977) ‘Volume Three: Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964’ in T. Karis & G. Carter (eds) 
From Protest to Challenge, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, p. 710. 
42 The 1913 Land Act confined the majority of black South Africans to ‘ native reserves’, later to become the 
‘self-governing homelands’. 
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associated traditional leadership with apartheid and tribalism and, as late as 1988, the ANC 
declared in its constitutional principles that traditional leadership was anachronistic to their 
modernist vision and that the organisation would abolish it with the advent of democracy.43 
Indeed, in the period immediately prior to the negotiated settlement and during the 
negotiations themselves, forces broadly allied to the ANC were locked in violent conflict with 
those supportive of traditional authorities, notably the KwaZulu-Natal based IFP. However, 
the ANC position softened and at its 50th National Conference in 1997 it adopted a resolution 
on traditional leadership.44 This dissuaded traditional authorities from participating in party 
politics but saw for them a full and constructive role in consultative processes on local 
development matters. 
 
In post-apartheid South Africa traditional authorities are recognised under the Constitution of 
1996 and are represented at national level by the National House of Traditional Leaders.45 
There is also a Provincial House of Traditional Leaders in six of the nine provinces.46  In 1998 
the White Paper on Local Government accorded them a role in local government, and in 2003 
the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill (TLGFB) sought to reinforce 
their role in local governance. The White Paper on Local Government issued by the Ministry 
for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development in March 1998 saw traditional leaders 
playing an important developmental role in local government, but under the rubric of the 
National Constitution and with municipalities having final and sole jurisdiction, reflecting 
very much the 1997 ANC position on traditional authorities. The White Paper states that on 
issues such as development, “‘a cooperative relationship will have to be developed”, and it 
generally presents an image of traditional leaders as benign overseers of local disputes, 
adjudicators of traditions and customs and facilitators on matters of development. Both the 
White Paper and the Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998) built in a consultative 
role for traditional authorities at the local level, especially on development issues. However, 
this did not constitute a direct role in decision-making.47 Hence the role of traditional leaders 
and their position and functions relative to elected councillors and democratic government 
remained unclear although in the run up to the 1999 general election, the remuneration of 
traditional leaders was finally set, effectively doubling the salary bill for traditional leaders 
across the country. 48 
 
It has been argued that the Constitution was deliberately vague on their powers and functions 
because of ambivalence within the ANC itself over the future of traditional structures.49 
Consequently and as demonstrated below, efforts by the government in post-apartheid South 
                                                 
43 Jacobs, S., ‘The politics of traditional leadership’, E-Politics, 11 (5 March 2000), Cape Town: Institute for a 
Democratic Alternative in South Africa, at http://www.idasa.org.za, p.1. 
44 Jacobs (2000), p.1. 
45 When placed in comparative perspective, the system adopted in South Africa at the national and provincial 
levels is close to that of Ghana, where traditional authorities have advisory, ceremonial and extra -constitutional 
powers and are confined to matters of the chieftaincy. At local level, however, the system veers closer to 
countries where traditional authorities have been incorporated into the processes of modern government such as 
Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
46 KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Free State, Mpumalanga, North West Province and Limpopo. 
47 The Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998) served to entrench the focus on the role of traditional 
authorities in local development, but still firmly under the authority of municipal councils.  
48 C. Goodenough, Traditional Leaders, A KwaZulu-Natal Study, 1999 to 2001, Durban: Independent Projects 
Trust, 2002, p.20. 
49 N. Levy & C. Tapscott, ‘Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa: The Challenges of Cooperative 
Government’, in N. Levy and C. Tapscott (eds), Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa, The Challenges of 
Co-operative Government, Cape Town: Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA), 2001, 
pp.1-21. 
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Africa to confine the chiefs to an advisory role or to matters affecting traditional communities 
and customary law, sometimes appear half-hearted and they are constantly contested by 
traditional leaders, nowhere more vigorously than in KZN. The TLGFB provides for 
traditional councils that will operate within and alongside other local government structures. 
Section Three of the Bill states that “traditional communities” must establish these councils, 
which in turn must comprise “traditional leaders and members of the traditional community 
selected by the principal traditional leader concerned in terms of custom”. Where the old 
tribal authorities exist, established in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, they will 
simply be converted into traditional councils. What this means in effect is that legislation 
introduced in the 21st Century will give perpetual life to old apartheid institutions created by 
the much-hated Bantu Authorities Act, all in the name of preserving tradition. 
 
Ubukhosi in KwaZulu-Natal 
Important as ubukhosi might be in the contemporary institutional landscape of KZN, the 
amakhosi and their isinduna continue to occupy an ambiguous position in the polity. This is 
not least because of the role they played in the violence that plagued the province during the 
political transition from apartheid. While the civil war in KwaZulu and Natal was primarily 
an urban war, especially in the early stages, it was fuelled from the countryside, where the 
amakhosi and their isinduna, most of whom gave their allegiance to Inkatha, called on the 
inhabitants of their areas to fight and attack the militant youth in the city’s townships. As 
Kentridge has explained, they were able to “exact their traditional rights from farmers and 
homesteaders in the form of military duty”. They did so in return for favours “ranging from 
land allocation to the issuing of licences” which though not a legal obligation was “a difficult 
summons to resist nonetheless”. 50 
 
The ANC was ultimately successful at national level and retained its popular urban support 
base in KZN. This served to thwart the divisive tendencies at work in the province at the time 
of transition, in which the IFP was deeply implicated, and provided a platform from which to 
try and win over a larger vote within the province. It also countered a tendency dating back to 
colonial times, for local politics and governance in KZN to work ‘within and without’ the 
South African polity and often at odds with the mainstream.51 Under-currents of separatism 
were rife in the region and were not confined to the white population in Natal. They were 
matched by Buthelezi’s periodic threats of KwaZulu secession, which continued until very 
recently.52 Indeed, it was only at the last minute that the IFP was added to the national ballot 
form, when Buthelezi finally agreed to participate in the historic 1994 elections. Against this 
background, few were surprised that while the rest of the country was caught up in the 
euphoria of declaring itself ‘the rainbow nation’ KZN was experiencing a more difficult and 
protracted transition to democracy.  
 
                                                 
50 M. Kentridge, An Unofficial War, Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg , Cape Town: David Philip, 1990, 
p.52. 
51 For example, predominantly English-speaking white Natalians hesitated to join the Union of South Africa in 
1910, railed against South Africa becoming a Republic in 1961, mourned the departure from the Commonwealth 
and relished their self-styled identity as ‘The Last Outpost’ of the British Empire (J. Beall, J.  Grest, H. Hughes & 
G. Maré, ‘Conceptualising Natal: Implications of a Regional Political Economy’, Working Paper for the 
Southern African Studies Seminar, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1984; and ‘The Natal Option: Regional 
Distinctiveness within the National Reform Process’, Paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual Congress of the 
Association for Sociology in Southern Africa, University of Natal, Durban, 1986). 
52 Natal Mercury, 18 March 2002. 
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Political reconciliation was easier to effect in the context of national politics, where senior 
politicians in both the ANC and IFP began to enjoy the fruits of office and patronage,53 but 
more difficult at provincial level where the rewards were more modest and the challenges in 
some ways far greater. The amalgamation of the old Natal and KwaZulu administrations 
proved much more difficult because they both had a very different organizational ethos. One 
outcome was the fragmentation of the provincial bureaucracy between three geographical 
centres (Pietermaritzburg, Ulundi and Durban) as a result of a messy political compromise 
that makes inter-sectoral coordination difficult.54 Another outcome is that key provincial 
government portfolios fall under ministers of different political persuasion and who do not 
cooperate, making achievement of the national government’s target of integrated development 
planning difficult. In part giving rise to these outcomes and affecting political and policy 
accord was the significance accorded to ubukhosi in the old KwaZulu administration so that 
reaching an acceptable decision on the role, powers and functions of the amakhosi emerged as 
a fissure in ANC and IFP relations in the province.  
 
National legislation allowed for the establishment of a Provincial House of Traditional 
Leaders.55 Issues of concern to traditional authorities get debated here first and then enter later 
into the debates of the National Legislative Assembly. This can be a long-winded process and, 
as many amakhosi are also IFP MPs, one that can lead to roles and agendas becoming 
problematically entangled. A critical point of conflict has been repeated attempts by the 
KwaZulu-Natal government since 1994 to pass its own Constitution. A draft Provincial 
Constitution was passed in 1996 and ratified by all seven parties in the Provincial Legislature, 
but was disallowed by the Constitutional Court. The draft contained a chapter on the monarch, 
traditional authorities and related matters. It sought to curtail the powers of the King by 
requiring that his actions needed to be approved by the Premier and where appropriate, the 
competent Minister. Unsurprisingly, given its origins with IFP supporters, it simultaneously 
sought to elevate the position of the amakhosi, “as the primary local government 
administrators of their respective communities”. 56 The application to the Constitutional Court 
was opposed but the debate continues to simmer.  
 
The situation at provincial level was not helped by the fact that there was not much 
constitutional or legislative guidance on local government, particularly in rural areas and it 
was left to provincial government to decide on what form of local government was most 
appropriate. The result was that “traditional leaders were given tremendous powers over a 
relatively lengthy period of transition”. 57 This allowed them to entrench their already 
considerable influence at local level and then to extend it further in the context of national 
level negotiations. In KZN much more permissive legislation already existed in the former 
self-governing territory of KwaZulu in the form of the KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyisa 
                                                 
53 R. W. Johnston & A. Johnston, ‘Pressure Builds for an Election Deal’, 1998, at http://www.sn.apc.org. 
54 Ulundi was the capital of the self-governing territory of KwaZulu and Buthelezi’s power base, 
Pietermaritzburg was the capital of Natal Province also a centre of ANC support, while Mtshali controversially 
lives in the main urban centre Durban where much bureaucratic business gets done, but insists on still keeping 
both provincial capitals. Vast amounts of money are spent on flying the Premier Lionel Mtshali and members of 
the Provincial Assembly from one capital to another in a Lear jet bought especially for the purpose. 
55 This falls under the Department of Traditional Affairs and Local Government and like the National House, it is 
mainly concerned with customary practices and issues of concern to the institution of ubukhosi, involving itself 
with succession issues and the appointment of amakhosi . 
56 Cited in Goodenough (2002), p.36. 
57 L. Mbatha, ‘Democratising Local Government: Problems and Opportunities in the Advancement of Gender 
Equality in South Africa’, in A. M. Goetz and S. Hassim (eds), No Shortcuts to Power, African Women in 
Politics and Policy Making, London: Zed Books, 2003, p.191. 
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Act (Act No. 9 of 1990) and its various amendments.58 These Acts saw the amakhosi and 
isiphakanyiswa (chiefs not of royal blood) not only upholding traditional laws and customs 
but also having a more significant role at local government level. As McIntosh, Sibanda, 
Vaughan and Xaba have pointed out, this came to be the ANC position as well, with the 
government hoping to create bodies that could render what were in effect “local government 
services”. 59 As the ANC has become increasingly conciliatory towards traditional leaders, not 
least because of the pressure sustained by the amakhosi of KwaZulu-Natal, so the role of the 
latter in local government is becoming not only clearer but also stronger. 
 
National- level legislation that had a particular impact and that gave rise to a blistering 
backlash from the amakhosi was the Municipal Demarcation Act (Act No. 27 of 1998), 
which, following the first round of local government elections in 1995/6, established a 
Municipal Demarcation Board in order to redraw municipal boundaries across the country. 
The demarcation process aimed at introducing uniformity in local government structures on 
the basis of cohesive physical and environmental areas; the potential for sustainable service 
delivery; financial viability within functional boundaries and administrations; political 
acceptability and the potential for redistribution of functions and resources. Although 
presented as a technical exercise, the demarcation process was also an intensely political one, 
concerned first and foremost with overcoming the legacies of apartheid planning and racially 
skewed resource distribution. 60  A major point of contestation related to traditional authority 
areas, as the Demarcation Board decided to incorporate traditional authorities into 
municipalities and some of the new municipalities cut right across rural districts and tribal 
land. The process in KZN was particularly volatile and although consultations took place 
between the Board and every tribal authority in the province, sometimes this could only take 
place under the protection of the army. 61  
 
In January 2000 the amakhosi held a protest imbizo in Umlazi, one of the urban townships of 
Durban, to oppose the new municipal boundaries in KZN, the subdivision of their land and a 
representation of only ten percent on elected councils. Not long afterwards, the Zulu king met 
with President Mbeki to represent the concerns of the amakhosi. Thereafter, Thabo Mbeki and 
Sidney Mufamadi, the Minister of Provincial and Local Government, met representatives of 
traditional leaders from across the country and advised them to make submissions to the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government. In June that year the Demarcation Board 
began investigating potential municipal outer boundaries in KZN giving rise to a scathing 
attack from Buthelezi who claimed the “way of life of traditional leaders” was under threat. 
By August, after pressure from within the ANC itself, Mbeki increased the participation of 
traditional leaders in local councils from ten to 20 percent but did not give into their demand 
for 50 percent representation as against 50 percent elected representatives. This resulted in a 
stand off that saw Mufamadi postponing the announcement of a local government election 
date for the third time. It was eventually set for 5 December 2000, after traditional leaders 
accepted an undertaking from Mbeki to act on proposals to preserve their powers and 
                                                 
58 There were subsequent amendments: KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Amendment Act, No. 9 of 
1991; KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Amendment Act, No. 3 of 1992; KwaZulu Amakhosi and 
Iziphakanyiswa Amendment Act, No. 7 of 1993; and KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Amendment Act, 
No. 19 of 1993 (Goodenough, 2002, p.30). 
59 A. McIntosh, S. Sibanda, A. Vaughan & T. Xaba, ‘Traditional Authorities and Land Reform in South Africa: 
Lessons from KwaZulu-Natal’, Development Southern Africa, 13:3 (1996), pp.38-39. 
60 The demarcation process reduced the number of municipalities from 843 to 284 (Goodenough, 2002, p.40). 
61 S. Mkize, P. Sithole & S. Vawda, ‘Governance, Democracy and the Subject of the Traditional Authorities in 
the eThekweni (Durban) Metropolitan Region’, unpublished mimeo, 2001, p.45. 
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functions in the new local government structures.62 Nevertheless, relations between KZN 
province and central government remained tense so that King Zwelethini has had to adopt a 
negotiating role and church leaders have stepped into the breach to avert a showdown. Even 
the ANC Secretary-General Kgalema Motlanthe said in July 2001 that relations between the 
KZN amakhosi and the party had to be addressed as a matter of urgency. 63  
 
An important reason for the stand off was that addressing political representation left 
unsolved the crunch issues around which the amakhosi would not rest, that of control over 
land. The White paper saw traditional authorities continuing to make recommendations on 
land allocation and the settling of land disputes but the amakhosi wanted more gilt edged 
guarantees than that. These they finally achieved through the Communal Land Rights Bill 
(CLRB) that gives them the power to control and allocate land and the accompanying 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill (TLGFB), both of which were 
pushed through parliament at the end of 2003. The first draft provided for the community to 
appoint an administrative structure of its own members. Traditional leaders could sit on these 
bodies as ex- officio members but they could make up no more than a quarter of the body and 
would have no veto powers. However, in October 2003, the Cabinet approved a change to the 
bill that gave effective control over these administrative structures - now called traditional 
councils – to traditional leaders.  
 
Why, on the eve of achieving its largest electoral victory yet, did the ANC put at risk the very 
democracy for which it fought so hard by rushing through legislation that entrenches the 
power of traditional authorities over their mainly rural subjects? In order to account for this 
we need to recall how the usually pro-ANC CONTRALESA chiefs during the 1995 local 
government elections threatened to dissuade their subjects from participating, after 
government had sought to abolish headmen in the Eastern Cape. It was following this episode 
that the ANC recognised the power of chieftaincy. 64 Similarly, just before the 1999 general 
election the stipends and allowances of chiefs were raised as a way of mollifying them. With 
regard to the more recent legislation that elevates the position of traditional authorities, 
veteran journalist Alistair Sparks advances the following by way of explanation:  
It is a sweetener to the traditional chiefs and headmen - either in the hope of 
winning them over in the ANC's bid to gain control of KwaZulu-Natal or, on a 
more charitable analysis, to prevent them instigating bloodshed during the 
election campaign.... The Deputy Minister of Land Affairs, Dirk du Toit, told a 
media briefing in Cape Town recently it was imperative that the bill be passed 
before the election. ‘If we want to get security we must work with the traditional 
groups’, he said. 65 
However, the price to be paid for political expediency is very high. Displeasing the chief 
could potentially render an individual or a family homeless and without a livelihood.  
 
Women are particularly vulnerable under the traditional system, in which they have curtailed 
rights and no access to communal resources outside their relationship with their father or 
husband. For South African women, this legislative turn amounts to taking one step forward 
and three steps back. The 30 percent quota for women on party lists was legislated for at other 
higher levels of government, is advised but not enforced at local level, and is made a mockery 
                                                 
62 Goodenough (2002), pp.50-52. 
63 Goodenough (2002), pp.53-57. 
64 Jacobs (2000), p.1. 
65 Natal Witness, 25 February 2004. 
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within a system that gives so much weight to structures dominated by non-elected men who 
owe their position to a hereditary principle. As a sop to women and in the name of 
modernising if not democratising traditional structures, the Traditional Leadership Bill insists 
that one third of the ‘traditional community’ must be women and 25 percent have to be 
elected. The bill states that all traditional councils must adhere to this within the space of four 
years but there are no sanctions if there is a failure to do so. Given the inevitable negative 
impact on the rights of women, there may be some weight to the argument that the joint effect 
of the bills is anti-constitutional. Many communities have strenuously opposed the bills, as 
have the Human Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality, as well as the 
Legal Resources Centre, which is taking the issue to the Constitutional Court.  
 
A lot of people in South Africa question the legitimacy of traditional authorities in a modern 
democracy and many within the ANC believe that the chiefs cannot expect the same rights as 
democratically elected representatives. This position, which is also held by Inkatha’s 
traditional political ally, the Democratic Alliance (DA), holds that chieftaincies should not be 
allowed to hold the government to ransom. Others support traditional systems of governance, 
arguing that they have continued salience in contemporary South Africa and have to be 
accommodated. For the traditional authorities themselves, it seems they will stop at nothing 
short of constitutional protection of their powers and functions. This is something that the 
Government has so far resisted, insisting that traditional authorities must work together with 
democratically-elected bodies and in the interests of local development while transforming 
themselves to become more democratic within the framework of the Constitution. However, 
recent legislation has ceded a lot of ground.  
 
If traditional authorities are to earn some level of legitimacy they need to play a positive 
developmental role, working in cooperation with elected local councillors and representative 
community structures. While experience has been varied, there have been some positive 
indications emerging in Durban that suggest that traditional authorities can accommodate 
themselves to democratic structures and processes. In 2000, a new metropolitan municipal 
council (which united the seven former local councils responsible for administering the old 
Durban metropolitan area) was established for Greater Durban, the eThekwini Municipality. 
It occupies approximately 2300 km2, constituting two per cent of the total area of KZN and 
has a population of over three million people, almost a third of the total provincial population 
of 9,426,017.66 The new metropolitan boundaries also embraced 15 traditional authority areas 
and their leaders, which formerly fell under the Ilembe Regional Council, a transitional 
governance structure that had been set up after the 1996 local government elections. Initially 
the amakhosi in Greater Durban did not want to be part of the demarcation process and 
negotiations with them were difficult. Disagreements coalesced around concerns about the 
balance of power between the amakhosi and the Mayor and elected councillors, as the 
traditional leaders were mainly supportive of Inkatha, while the mayor and a majority of the 
councillors in the city were affiliated to the ANC. There were also anxieties about the roles 
and representation of the amakhosi in municipal structures. Although the legislation allows 
for traditional leaders attending and participating in council meetings, it was unclear on the 
crucial issue of voting rights, which have so far been denied. A third bone of contention was 
over the perceived lack of consultation with the amakhosi during the demarcation process and 
a perceived threat as to the future of ubukhosi.67  
 
                                                 
66 Republic of South Africa, Census 2001. 
67 Mkize et al. (2001). 
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Despite the assault on the integrity of traditional authority area boundaries, there is evidence 
that for some of the 15 traditional authority structures a workable representative arrangement 
within municipal institutions is being forged. While resistance to incorporation into 
eThekwini Municipality remains acute among some of the amakhosi of eThekwini, others see 
it as the best chance of development for their areas. In the battle for the hearts and minds of 
eThekwini’s amakhosi, the City is seeking to deliver to traditional authority with capit al 
investment to the tune of R200 million in the next planning phase.68  Where they are 
supportive there is evidence that investment and development is leading some among the 
amakhosi to question whether their loyalties are better served by engagement with the city 
rather than with the IFP and the Province. It may well be that the deliberate channelling of 
resources to eThekwini Municipality’s traditional authority areas is designed to win political 
favour in IFP-supporting areas, rather than to win the chie ftaincy over towards cooperation 
within an inclusive structure of metropolitan governance. Nevertheless, even if this is the case 
engagement in democratic local governance is serving as a demonstration effect so that non-
participating traditional authorities are pondering over where their future best lies. Moreover, 
our interviews with the amakhosi suggest that initial opposition, or passive resistance, is now 
turning to grudging and even enthusiastic acceptance.  
 
It is too soon to tell whether this is a unidirectional and sustainable trajectory. Suspicion on 
the part of the amakhosi over arrangements for their representation and involvement within 
municipal institutions is built on layer upon layer of manipulation of the institution of 
ubukhosi, by colonial and apartheid authorities, as well as the IFP and the ANC in the context 
of resistance politics and reconstruction. This is as true for the city of Durban as for the 
province of KZN. From the perspective of the amakhosi then, eThekwini Municipality may 
well be simply one more structure in a continuous tradition of local government agents who 
have stripped them of land, authority and responsibility. From the perspective of the City, or 
at least the City Manager the amakhosi are not a homogeneous group and they have to be 
engaged with according to democratic practice, as well as the development imperatives of 
particular areas.69 For example, among the 15 traditional authority areas there are those where 
the inkosi has real authority and those where he does not and where power lies with the 
isinduna. In some areas there is conflict between the traditional leaders and the councillors, 
while in an increasing number of areas there is cooperation between them. Nevertheless, 
disputes and tensions do arise, whether because of party political differences or competition 
over delivery or claims of credit for bringing water, electricity and other services to an area. 
 
The political strength of the ANC in Durban as well as the predominance of an urban culture 
and strong foundations of democratic urban governance in the city suggests that the city could 
act as a vanguard in terms of incorporating traditional authority within a broader democratic 
governance arena. However, there is also evidence that the city is increasingly 
accommodating tradition. Some of the local councillors, for example, have been donning 
traditional dress for council meetings.70 Moreover, although the city started out determined 
that ubukhosi would have to be bent into democratic shape by a cooperative engagement with 
democratic structures of metropolitan governance – led by elected councillors who would be 
advised and guided by the amakhosi and their izinduna – more recently, and in line with 
national policy on the matter, it has acknowledged their demand for privileged recognition 
and authority. In the 18 March 2003 Newsletter of the City Manager, the City Manager, 
Michael Sutcliffe, proudly announced, in what some might regard as a capitulation:  
                                                 
68 Michael Sutcliffe, personal communication, April 2003. 
69 Personal communication, April 2003. 
70 Natal Mercury, 18 April 2003. 
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17 March 2003 will go down in history as a day of significance for developing 
broad-based institutions of governance in eThekwini and South Africa. In the 
eThekwini Council meeting of that date, Council agreed that those traditional 
leaders with jurisdiction within the boundaries of eThekwini should be invited to 
participate in municipal affairs. Given the way that colonial and apartheid 
governments had whittled down traditional areas, from comprising the majority of 
our country to today comprising some 6% of the area of South Africa, that 
decision of Council will go a long way to restoring our sense of who we are and 
where we have come from. In section 212 [sic] of the Constitution provision is 
made that national legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as 
an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities. The Municipal 
Structures Act regulates that arrangement and today’s decision by Council brings 
it into effect. By doing so, eThekwini becomes the first metropolitan area, and the 
first major municipality, to allow for traditional leaders to participate in the affairs 
of governance.71 
 
Both the Municipal Structures Act and the White Paper on Local Government build in a 
consultative role for traditional authorities at the local level, especially on development issues. 
However, this does not constitute a direct role in decision-making. While in Durban the 
emphasis on a developmental role remains, in this statement the City is making a serious 
commitment to involving the amakhosi of eThekwini more substantively, taking it a step 
beyond practice currently operative at other spheres of government and in many ways 
prefiguring the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill that followed it. 
   
Conclusion  
The way in which chieftaincy and government relate in Africa is revealing of national 
ideology. The barometer of traditional institutions and the ANC’s conciliatory stance towards 
them confirms a post-colonial impulse in South Africa that is unapologetically Africanist. The 
relationship between traditional leaders and African governments also speaks to the nature of 
political alliances and constituencies operating at different levels. The ANC, while 
predominantly an urban and urbane political party, is bent, at any cost, on wooing into the 
fold, and away from opposition parties, those leaders than can deliver rural constituencies. 
The implications of this are potentially grave for South Africa’s nascent democracy. Mamdani 
reaches a similar conclusion in his book Citizen and Subject.  He argues, too, for an historical 
understanding of the long-term entrenchment of ‘indirect rule’ in Africa, a system he dubs “a 
regime of differentiation”, which has far outlived its colonial beginnings and is deeply 
implicated in the tenacity of the institution of chieftaincy today. 72 We concur with this view, 
but do not necessarily support the bifurcated analysis that accompanies it, which paints a 
dichotomised world of urban citizens and rural subjects. Ubukhosi, like other institutions, is 
neither monolithic nor coherent. The institution of chieftaincy is not hermetically sealed from 
other institutions.  
 
While institutions are resistant to change they can and do evolve. Moreover, as Bates has 
argued, we often under-estimate the extent to which political interventions and settlements 
can create new, or lead to the evolution of old, institutions.73 In South Africa over the last ten 
                                                 
71 Michael Sutcliffe, Newsletter of the City Manager, 18 March 2003. 
72 Mamdani (1996). 
73 Bates (1995). 
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years traditional institutions started out in political competition with those of liberal 
democracy. This was illustrated above through the exchange between Prince Gideon Zulu and 
Peggy Nkonyeni in the KwaZulu-Natal Legislative Assembly and in the way that the 
Communal Land Rights Bill and the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill 
are being contested in the Constitutional Court by civil society organisations concerned with 
human rights and the rights of women. At the same time, in a context of institutional 
multiplicity such as that which exists in South Africa, there are also processes of institutional 
mutation that are giving rise to evolving and mutually constitutive forms of governance.  
 
Our research in eThekwini suggests that there are areas of accommodation and fusion 
emerging between so-called traditional institutions and so-called modern ones. These are 
sometimes spontaneous and at other times deliberate. Deliberate fusion often relates to 
cultural practices and protocol, for example observing rituals of respect towards the amakhosi, 
or to language and symbols, such as when an urbane local councillor wears traditional dress 
or an Inkosi arrives at a cons tituency meeting in his four-by-four vehicle and acknowledges 
women and men as equal participants. To the extent that the institution of chieftaincy can be 
incorporated into the democratic system without being robbed of its remarkable attributes of 
solidity and cohesion and without undermining the hard-won rights of citizens, ubukhosi 
could become a site for stability in South Africa.  
 
To the extent that it remains a political football and provides increasing concessions towards 
the amakhosi at the expense of citizens, then ubukhosi will remain a faultline running through 
South African democracy. Institutions can be left to evolve and mutate, with much depending 
on the demonstration effect of cooperation in successful development and democratic 
governance over time. However, this could take too long for the safeguarding of South 
African democracy. What becomes ‘rational’ to individuals and normative in society is 
shaped by the diffusion of cultural values and practices through institutions,74 requiring a 
conscious political challenge to the persistence of hierarchical and patriarchal institutions and 
practices. The resurgence of chieftaincy in South Africa reveals just how muddy are the 
waters between state and society, how deeply public and private institutions are enmeshed in 
each other.  As Whitehead and Tsikata have argued with regard to women in Africa, “the 
answer is democratic reform and state accountability, particularly with respect to women’s 
political interests and voices, not a flight into the customary”. 75 In South Africa, much 
depends on the resolve of the ANC not to give into the more obscurantist demands of 
chieftaincy in the interests of political expediency. This is essential not only for a democratic 
polity but for a democratic society as well because a democratic culture cannot simply be 
forged at the ballot box.  
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